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R12This paper examines the impact of a government programmewhich facilitated the entry of for-proﬁt surgical cen-
tres to compete against incumbent National Health Service hospitals in England. We examine the impact of com-
petition from these surgical centres on the efﬁciency – measured by pre-surgery length of stay for hip and knee
replacement patients – and case mix of incumbent public hospitals. We exploit the fact that the government
chose the broad locations where these surgical centres (Independent Sector Treatment Centres or ISTCs) would
be built based on local patientwaiting times–not length of stay or clinical quality – to construct treatment and con-
trol groups that are comparable with respect to key outcome variables of interest. Using a difference-in-difference
estimation strategy, we ﬁnd that the government-facilitated entry of surgical centres led to shorter pre-surgery
length of stay at nearby public hospitals. However, these new entrants took on healthier patients and left incum-
bent hospitals treating patients who were sicker. This paper highlights a potential trade-off that policymakers
face when they promote competition from private, for-proﬁt ﬁrms in markets for the provision of public services.
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Public services1. Introduction
In the 2000s, there was a widespread push in Europe and the United
States to increase the role of user choice and provider competition in pub-
lic services. In general, these pro-market reforms were designed to in-
crease the quality and efﬁciency of public services like health care and
education, which had previously been run through non-market means
like performance management (Gaynor and Town, 2011; Propper et al.,
2007, 2010). Often, as part of these market-based reforms, policymakers
encouraged the entry of private, for-proﬁtﬁrms to compete against public
sector providers. These efforts are exempliﬁed by the growing use of
charter schools in the United States and private health care providers inpublicly funded health systems in Western Europe (Jost et al.,
2006; Fryer Jr, 2012). This paper explores how competition gener-
ated by the government-facilitated entry of private, for-proﬁt ﬁrms
affects the performance of incumbent public providers. In particular,
we estimate the impact of the entry of a series of private, for-proﬁt
surgical centres in the English National Health Service (NHS).
Policymakers steered the entry of these surgical centres to areas
with high patient waiting times, with the aims of increasing surgical
capacity and stimulating competition.We estimate the impact of this
private provider entry on the efﬁciency of incumbent public
hospitals, and examine whether it left incumbents with a riskier
and more costly mix of patients.
Advocates of diversifying the supply of public services providers
argue that private, for-proﬁt entrants will innovate and offer higher
quality than incumbents, and that entry of private providers will
create competitive pressure on public providers to raise their own
64 Z. Cooper et al. / Journal of Public Economics 166 (2018) 63–80performance (Le Grand, 2009; Seddon, 2007). We are particularly fo-
cused on testing this latter claim: can the entry of private, for-proﬁt sur-
gical centres improve the performance of incumbent public hospitals?
Critics of market-based reforms generally cite the many ways that
public services, and health care in particular, differ from highly stylised,
perfectly competitive markets, and argue that competition will not
improve performance (Jones and Mays, 2009; Fotaki et al., 2008).
Moreover, it is sometimes argued that, because new entrants are often
much smaller than incumbents (in our case, we analyse surgical centres
competing against hospitals), theymay not have sufﬁcient scale to affect
the behaviour of existing providers (Goddard, 2015). A third criticism is
that private, for-proﬁt ﬁrms may select customers with desirable
characteristics (e.g. better students or less risky patients), leaving public
providers treating a riskier or costlier group of users (Los Angeles Times
Editorial Board, 2016; Bardsley and Dixon, 2011). More generally, it is
not clear that governments are well equipped to determine where to
locate entrants in such a way as to engineer effective competition.
The English NHS provides a unique environment inwhich to test the
effect of private, for-proﬁt provider entry on public service providers'
performance, and in so doing to analyse the extent to which govern-
ments can ‘create’ competition. In the 2000s, the British government
facilitated the entry of Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs).
ISTCs are private, for-proﬁt surgical centres focused on provision of rou-
tine, high volume elective (i.e. medically necessary, non-emergency,
scheduled in advance) surgical procedures to public (NHS) patients.
This policy was part of a wider policy package designed to tackle
waiting times within the English NHS, the centrepiece of which was
an ambitious set of targets to reduce waiting times for surgery. ISTCs
were established to rapidly expand capacity in regions deemed at risk
of notmeeting these targets (Naylor and Gregory, 2009). As we demon-
strate, while the placement of these specialty surgical centres was cor-
related with local public hospital waiting times during the pre-policy
period, their placement was uncorrelated with measures of the
efﬁciency and clinical quality of these incumbents over the sameperiod.
This implies that treatment assignment was unrelated to the pre-policy
levels of the outcome variables we study. In addition, we demonstrate
that public hospitals close to ISTC entrants had nearly identical pre-
entry trends to public hospitals unexposed to ISTC entry across a
range of performance measures (other than waiting times). We use
this observation to motivate a difference-in-difference (DiD) strategy
to estimate the causal effect of ISTC entry on outcomes at nearby public
hospitals and highlight that our control group serves a good counterfac-
tual for what would have occurred to the treatment group after 2004/5
in the absence of the entry of ISTCs.
Measuring efﬁciency of health care provision is a long-standing
challenge because of the absence or poor standard of data on costs
and quality. Faced with these problems, researchers have frequently
used patient length of stay (LOS) as a proxy for efﬁciency (Fenn and
Davies, 1990; Martin and Smith, 1996; Gaynor et al., 2013) on the
grounds that, provided clinical quality can be maintained, shorter LOS
implies lower costs for the same outcomes. However, a key difﬁculty
with using LOS to capture efﬁciency is that it is heavily inﬂuenced by
patient characteristics – patients in poorer health before surgery will
tend to have longer lengths of stay for reasons unrelated to hospital
efﬁciency. In this study, we use an innovative approach to address the
inﬂuence of patient characteristics on LOS-based efﬁciency measures
by disaggregating LOS into two components: time from admission
until surgery (‘pre-surgery LOS’), and time from surgery until discharge
(‘post-surgery LOS’). We show that pre-surgery LOS is less affected by
patient characteristics than other components of LOS, and use it – or al-
ternatively, the percentage of patients treated on the day of admission –
as a proxy for hospital efﬁciency.
In what follows, we show that the entry of private, for-proﬁt
specialty surgical centres led to a 16% reduction in pre-surgery LOS at
nearby public hospitals – which translates to a 24 percentage point
increase in the proportion of patients treated on the day of admission.However, we also ﬁnd evidence that these entrants engaged in risk
selection, leaving nearby public hospitals with a sicker (and therefore
costlier) mix of patients. In particular, public hospitals exposed to the
entry of private specialty surgical centres experienced an 11.6% deteri-
oration in average patient health status as captured by the Charlson
score (deﬁned in Section 4). This increase in patient severity likely led
to an increase in post-surgery LOS at incumbent NHS hospitals. Finally,
while ISTC entry may have led to reduced case loads at some public
hospitals withwhich they shared amarket, we show that our estimated
treatment effects are not driven by changes in volume caused by ISTC
entry.
This paper adds to several literatures. First, it builds on previous
work assessing how the entry of private, for-proﬁt ﬁrms impacts the
performance of incumbent public service providers (Hoxby, 1994;
Barro et al., 2006; Cutler et al., 2010; Sass, 2006). In general, re-
searchers have struggled to assess the causal impact of competition
from new market entrants (e.g. surgical centres and charter schools)
into markets for public services because the entry location of private
ﬁrms is usually endogenous. We exploit the fact that siting of surgical
centres in England was driven by government policy tied to waiting
times, not our efﬁciency measure, and show that the entry of ISTCs
raised incumbent hospitals' productivity. Second, it adds to the broader
literature assessing the impact of hospital competition (Kessler and
McClellan, 2000; Gaynor et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2011). We illustrate
that, in markets where payments are regulated, competition can raise
hospitals' efﬁciency. Moreover, we ﬁnd that smaller entrants can affect
the behaviour of larger incumbents. Third, it adds to the literature
analysing whether private, for-proﬁt surgical centres offering public ser-
vices risk-select against public incumbents (Barro et al., 2006; Winter,
2003; Cram et al., 2005; Street et al., 2010; Zimmer and Guarino, 2013;
Bifulco and Reback, 2014). We ﬁnd that the entry of ISTCs left public hos-
pitals with a riskier mix of patients. To some extent, this was by design:
ISTCs in England were focused on treating uncomplicated cases. While
the entry of specialist surgical centres focused on routine procedures
could in theory represent efﬁcient patient sorting, such an arrangement
is likely to leave existing providers treating a sicker patient mix and
worse off ﬁnancially, unless it is accompanied by a reimbursement
system that adequately adjusts payments to reﬂect patient severity. The
consensus is that NHS payments were not adequately risk adjusted
during the period we investigate (Mason et al., 2008), meaning that
NHS hospitals that had an ISTC enter nearby were likely left worse off as
a result of being left with a sicker mix of patients.
More generally, this paper highlights the trade-offs that policymakers
face when considering policies to encourage the entry of for-proﬁt ﬁrms
to compete with public service providers. Facilitating entry can lead to
competition, which can prompt incumbent providers to raise their
performance. However, these for-proﬁt entrantsmay have very different
objectives than incumbent providers, and may have a higher propensity
to risk-select in order to draw amore advantageous mix of patients. Our
work highlights the need for policy-makers to take risk-adjustment of
payments seriously when considering policies to promote competition
between ﬁrms with different objectives and differing abilities to treat
complicated cases.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents background information on recent NHS reforms, with particu-
lar focus on the ISTC programme. Section 3 explores the potential
impact of ISTC entry on incumbents' performance. Section 4 presents
the data and empirical strategy. Section 5 reports the results, while
Section 6 discusses and concludes.
2. Recent NHS reforms and the ISTC programme
The English NHS, founded in 1948, is funded through general
taxation and, with few exceptions, offers health care that is free at the
point of use. Patients must register with a single general practice (GP)
clinic for the provision of primary care, and GPs act as ‘gatekeepers’ to
3 Two of the 27Wave 1 ISTCs had parent companieswithmoremixed ownership struc-
tures. Circle Health, which co-ran Nottingham ISTCwith the for-proﬁt Nations Healthcare,
was to a limited extent a doctors'mutual. TheNewYork PresbyterianHealthcare System, a
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is organised around large public hospitals.
The NHS long struggled with waiting times for elective surgery,
which, in some cases, could exceed a year. In 1997, a new Labour
government was elected promising quick action to reduce waiting
times. However, 1 year later, waiting times had increased (Klein, 2013,
p.200).1 Concerns over waiting times became the catalyst for a series of
reforms from 2000 onwards, which included rigorous performance
management of public hospitals; introduction of patient choice and
hospital competition underpinned by prospective reimbursement; and
facilitated entry of specialist private surgical centres to compete with
larger public hospital incumbents. The new prospective reimbursement
system (known as Payment by Results or PbR) was modelled on the
Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) system used in Medicare in the United
States (US). Under PbR, hospital reimbursement is tied to activity rather
than to annual budgets or block contracts as was previously the case
(DH, 2011).
In 2000, The Secretary of State released The NHS Plan (Secretary of
State for Health, 2000), in which the government committed to cutting
maximum waiting times for elective surgery from 18 months to
6 months by the end of 2005 (later reduced to 18 weeks, by 2008)
using a series of targets tied to rewards and punishments. There is
substantial evidence that the targets and performance management
regime was extremely effective at reducing waiting times (Propper
et al., 2008, 2010; Besley et al., 2009).
As part of its reform programme, in April 2002 the government
announced that it was facilitating the entry of a series of privately
run surgical centres (ISTCs) to deliver routine, high-volume diagnos-
tic and elective surgical procedures to English NHS patients.2 Like
other NHS services, NHS-funded patients could use ISTCs free of
charge.
Although theNHShad longmade use of private providers in England,
ISTCs were distinctive in three ways. First, they were created as a delib-
erate policy of government, as opposed to being a result of decisions by
local commissioners of care. Second, they provided services exclusively
to NHS patients, as opposed to earlier arrangements in which NHS pa-
tients were treated in settings mainly focused on treatment of private
patients (Naylor and Gregory, 2009). Third, whereas NHS physicians
are in general permitted to also work in private settings, the ﬁrst wave
of ISTCs (which are the focus of this paper) were not allowed to use
NHS doctors. This restriction ensured that ISTCs represented genuine
new additions to capacity, rather than drawing away physician labour
from nearby public hospitals.
More than any other factor, it was local waiting times that
inﬂuenced where the government sought to locate the new private
surgical centres (HCHC, 2006). According to government ofﬁcials, “In
October 2002, the Department [of Health] conducted an extensive for-
ward planning exercise, during which all Strategic Health Authorities
were asked to identify, in conjunction with their respective Primary
Care Trusts, any anticipated gaps in their capacity needed to meet the
2005waiting times targets. The results of this exercise led to the identi-
ﬁcation of capacity gaps across the country, particularly in specialties
such as cataract removal and orthopaedic procedures, where additional
capacity was needed” (Anderson, 2006). Following this planning exer-
cise, in December 2002 the Department of Health invited expressions
of interest to run the ﬁrst Wave of ISTCs. These invitations indicated1 During this period, newspaper stories about excessive waiting times appeared regu-
larly in the popular press. As Klein (2013, p.202) writes, “No matter that the lengths of
the [waiting] lists were an ambiguous indicator of performance. Nomatter that theywere,
if anything, amisleadingmeasure of theNHS's ability tomeet demands.Waiting listswere
conﬁrmed as the symbol of the NHS's inability to meet public expectations of quick and
ready access to treatment.”
2 DH, 2002. This section also draws onNaylor and Gregory, 2009; Allen and Jones, 2011;
Anderson, 2006; BSG, 2005; and HCHC, 2006. ISTCs were also established in Wales and
Scotland, but are outside the scope of this paper, given the devolution of the NHS to the
constituent countries of the United Kingdom during this period.the broad geographical regions within which ISTCs were to be placed,
but left securing a speciﬁc site to bidders. Preferred bidders for these
schemes were announced from September 2003.
There were 27 Wave 1 ISTCs, all of which operated on a for-proﬁt
basis.3 Of these, 23 opened in 2005 or 2006 (see Fig. 1), and most
operated from a single site, often in newly built premises that were
often co-located with an existing NHS hospital. In March 2005, a second
Phase of ISTCs was announced, of which nine were eventually
implemented, with most opening between 2007 and 2008. These
Phase 2 ISTCswere smaller, provided awider range of services including
diagnosis, and were often on the same site as existing private hospitals.
Unlike Wave 1 ISTCs, Phase 2 ISTCs were permitted to recruit NHS staff
and employ NHS consultants privately. Phase 2 ISTCs were also required
to provide NHS training placements (Naylor and Gregory, 2009). Given
these very different characteristics of the Phase 2 programme, in this
paper we focus exclusively on analysing the impact of Wave 1 ISTCs by
excluding NHS hospitals that were potentially exposed to competition
fromWave 2 entrants.4
The ISTC programme had a major impact on the market for some
elective surgical procedures (Naylor and Gregory, 2009). From 2006,
ISTCs accounted for between 5 and 10% of orthopaedic volume
nationally. As the ISTC programme's impact was highly geographically
differentiated, the share of patients attending ISTCs was much higher
in some areas than in others. In some markets where ISTCs entered,
they became the only alternative to large incumbents. As one local
NHS ofﬁcial noted when a large ISTC opened next to a dominant
NHS hospital, “that's the ﬁrst time… we've ever had any competition”
(McLeod et al., 2014, p.15). The hope amongst the policymakers
responsible for the ISTC programme was that these entrants would
be less inclined to cooperate with NHS providers, and more inclined
to compete (Stevens, 2004). The prohibition on ISTCs employing
NHS physicians, and the fact that they were privately owned, may
also have contributed to an institutional culture at ISTCs that was
more receptive to competition than that of public hospitals (Le
Grand, 1999).
ISTC contracts speciﬁed a range of ‘exclusion criteria’ – acceptable
grounds for refusing to treat NHS patients – on the basis that ISTCs
did not possess the emergency or intensive care units required to
treat sicker and more complex patients. Each ISTC had its own list
of exclusion criteria, which typically included demographic factors
such as age, social factors such as availability of a carer at discharge,
and clinical factors such as health status (Mason et al., 2008). In rela-
tion to the latter, a particularly important criterion for rejection was
the patient's American Society of Anaesthesiologist's (ASA) score –
ISTCs were typically able to refuse to treat patients with a score of
3 or more.5 National Joint Registry data from 2010 indicates that, at
NHS hospitals, 20% of hip replacement patients and 19% of knee re-
placement patients were given ASA scores of 3 or 4. The correspond-
ing ﬁgures for ISTCs were only 6 and 8%, respectively (NJR, 2011).
Critics of the ISTC programme saw these exclusion criteria as particu-
larly problematic because they allowed the new entrants to dumpcharity, owned Specialist Hospitals Ltd., a for-proﬁt company that ran SheptonMallet ISTC.
All otherWave 1 ISTCswere run on an exclusively for-proﬁt basis, and even these two ex-
ceptional cases were run with a signiﬁcant for-proﬁt component.
4 To prevent our estimates being contaminated by effects arising from the Phase 2 ISTC
programme, we drop from our estimation sample any NHS hospital whose closest ISTC
was a Phase 2 ISTC, provided that this ISTC was close enough to act as a competitor (using
a criterion set out in Section 4).
5 ASA 1: Healthy patientwith localized surgical pathology and no systemic disturbance;
ASA 2: Patient with mild to moderate systemic disturbance (i.e. surgical pathology or
other disease process); ASA 3: Patient with severe systemic disturbance from any cause;
ASA 4: Patient with life threatening systemic disorder which severely limits activity;
ASA 5: Gravely ill patient with little chance of survival.
Fig. 1. Timeline of Wave I ISTC openings. Notes: Figure shows the distribution of Wave 1
ISTCs contract start dates, with our treatment-on date (April 2005) marked as a vertical
line. Three Wave 1 ISTCs had contract start dates before April 2005 but are not included
in our analysis, either because they did not have (sufﬁcient) orthopaedic capacity (the
Birkdale Clinic and the Cataract Initiative) or because of ambiguity over location and
differentiation from a nearby NHS hospital (Kiddeminister ISTC). Additionally, only two
Wave 1 ISTCs had contract start dates after December 2006: the Havant Diagnostic
Centre (January 2008), which only performed diagnostic procedures and which is
therefore not used for treatment assignment; and the Nottingham NHS Treatment
Centre (July 2008).
66 Z. Cooper et al. / Journal of Public Economics 166 (2018) 63–80costlier, more complex patients onto the public hospital system
(Wallace, 2006; Kmietowicz, 2006).6
3. Hypotheses on the impact of ISTC entry on incumbent
public hospitals
This section examines the likely response of public (NHS) hospitals
to the entry of private, for-proﬁt surgical centres (ISTCs). In understand-
ing the impact of the ISTC programme, it is important to note that,
although public NHS hospitals are run on a not-for-proﬁt basis, they
are ﬁnancially and managerially independent of central government,
and during this period had strong incentives to generate a ﬁnancial
surplus, or at least not to make substantial losses.
In the early 2000s, the government introduced a system of ‘star
rating’ of NHS hospitals, in which ﬁnancial performance was a major
factor (Bevan and Hood, 2006a, 2006b; DH, 2002). Hospitals given a
zero-star rating were ‘named and shamed’, and their chief executives
were at risk of losing their jobs. Later, high-performing hospitals
(those with Foundation Trust status) were given additional freedoms
to retain ﬁnancial surpluses across ﬁnancial years. Other hospitals
were eventually able to achieve Foundation Trust status in part through
good ﬁnancial performance. These factors meant that, during this
period, public hospitals had a strong incentive to generate operating
surpluses. It has therefore been argued that it is reasonable to think
of public hospitals during this period as maximising proﬁts plus some
additional term reﬂecting altruistic valuation of quality and/or quantity
(Gaynor et al., 2013).
Ultimately, Wave 1 ISTCs differed from public hospitals in three
key dimensions. First, they were explicitly for-proﬁt ventures. Second,
they were narrowly focused on offering a small range of elective sur-
gical procedures. Third, given their inability to hire NHS staff, their6 In addition, in an effort to facilitate the entry of private providers, NHS policymakers
negotiated ‘take or pay’ contracts guaranteeing that Wave 1 ISTCs would be paid for the
number of procedures speciﬁed in the contract, irrespective of the number of patients ac-
tually treated. Also, to encourage entry and cover initial capital costs, these ISTCs were
paid, on average, 11%more per procedure thanNHS providers (AC&HC 2008, p.51).Many
observers (e.g. HCHC, 2006; Squires, 2007; Player and Leys, 2008; Pollock and Godden,
2008; see also Moore, 2008 and McLeod et al., 2014) argue that these two provisions
meant that ISTCs offered poor value for money.institutional cultures may have differed sharply from those at NHS
hospitals. In what follows, keeping in mind these three differences,
we present hypotheses about the response of NHS hospitals to the
ISTC programme.
3.1. Efﬁciency
We expect ISTC entry to lead to efﬁciency improvements at nearby
incumbents. As mentioned in Section 1, we measure hospital efﬁciency
using pre-surgery LOS. Prospective reimbursement systems (like PbR in
England) pay hospitals on the basis of outputs rather than inputs. This
creates incentives for hospitals to reduce marginal costs by shortening
patient LOS (Cutler, 1995). Empirical studies of England (Farrar et al.,
2009), the United States (Feder et al., 1987; Guterman and Dobson,
1986; Feinglass and Holloway, 1991; Kahn et al., 1990), Israel
(Shmueli et al., 2002) and Italy (Louis et al., 1999) provide evidence
that prospective reimbursement leads to shorter LOS.
While prospective reimbursement systems provide incentives for
all hospitals to reduce patient LOS, these incentives will likely be
particularly sharp in more competitive markets. Hospitals located in
less competitive markets likely have limited scope to expand their
activity because they are constrained by the relative inelasticity of
clinical demand within their catchment areas. By contrast, hospitals
in more competitive markets have greater opportunity to expand
activity by capturing market share from other hospitals. To create
capacity for such expansion, in health care systems with prospective
reimbursement, hospitals in more competitive markets are likely to
take stronger action to reduce patient LOS, so that they can treat ad-
ditional patients. Consistent with this hypothesis, studies of the 2006
patient choice reforms in the English NHS found that hospitals located
in more competitive markets decreased their LOS by larger amounts
than hospitals in less competitive markets (Cooper et al., 2012;
Gaynor et al., 2013). In light of this theoretical prediction and empir-
ical evidence, we hypothesise that incumbent hospitals exposed to
entry by an ISTC will have reduced patient LOS over and above any
secular decreases in LOS resulting from the introduction of prospec-
tive reimbursement. We therefore identify the effect of ISTC entry
on the efﬁciency of nearby public hospitals using a DiD estimator in
which the treatment effect equals the change in efﬁciency at ISTC-
exposed public hospitals minus the change in efﬁciency at unexposed
public hospitals.
During the 2000s, the government announced that performing elec-
tive surgery on the day of a patient's admission was a key measure of
hospital performance, and highlighted that ISTCs would be particularly
effective at this. The NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement
(2006, 2008a, 2008b) identiﬁed surgery on day of admission as one
of the six characteristics of high-performing orthopaedic surgical facil-
ities and argued (2006, p.20) that public hospitals would have to re-
spond to competition from private entrants by streamlining their
production: “Same-day admissions [i.e. admission on day of surgery]
are seen as imperative by independent [private] providers. Acute [pub-
lic] trusts will need to reﬂect this as an integral element of any market
strategy when seeking to demonstrate competitive advantage.” This
explicit focus on admission on day of surgery means that, in addition
to the more general incentives to increase efﬁciency brought about
by surgical centre entry, we expect public hospitals facing increased
pressure from private surgical centres to have improved their perfor-
mance in this dimension in particular.
3.2. Case mix
The entry of private, for-proﬁt surgical centres could also change the
case mix at nearby incumbents due to risk selection by entrants.
Whereas in classical private goods markets the proﬁtability of selling
to a particular customer is determined solely by their willingness to
pay, in health caremarkets – as inmany othermarkets for the provision
67Z. Cooper et al. / Journal of Public Economics 166 (2018) 63–80of public services, such as social care and education – the proﬁtability of
treating a given customer will be inﬂuenced by characteristics of the
customer that are often imperfectly observed.
The inﬂuence of patient characteristics on proﬁtability provides all
hospitals with an incentive to refuse to treat the sickest patients.
However, private, for-proﬁt entrants like ISTCs are likely to be more
willing than public hospital incumbents to actively select against costly
patients, as for-proﬁt ﬁrms are able to redistribute proﬁts to share-
holders, whereas public hospitals are, at most, only allowed to reinvest
proﬁts into the organisation. The literature on specialty hospitals in the
US, for example, has found evidence that these providers select low-risk
patients, leaving the sickest patients to nearby general hospitals (Barro
et al., 2006; Winter, 2003; Cram et al., 2005).
Two further factors add weight to the hypothesis that ISTCs had
stronger incentives to risk-select than public hospital incumbents.
First, ISTCs could legally decline to treat complicated cases, whereas
public hospitals were formally prohibited from doing so. Second, as
mentioned previously, ISTCs were prohibited from using NHS doctors,
so their workplace culture likely differed sharply from that at incum-
bents. As Rose-Ackerman (1996) notes, the culture of staff plays a key
role in dictating ﬁrm behaviour – thus these cultural differences may
have led ISTCs to be more willing than NHS providers to engage in
proﬁt-driven risk-selection.
Prospective reimbursement encourages cream-skimming, since it
provides incentives for hospitals to avoid admitting patients whose
cost of treatment is likely to exceed the regulated payment (Allen and
Gertler, 1991; Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Ellis, 1998; Newhouse, 1989).
We use DiD methods to estimate the extent to which ISTCs left
incumbent NHS hospitals with a sicker, costlier mix of patients, over
and above any secular changes in case mix over this period (either as
a result of the introduction of prospective reimbursement, or for other
reasons).
Previous studies have conﬁrmed that ISTCs treated healthier and
less complex patients than nearby public hospitals (Street et al.,
2010; Mason et al., 2008, 2010; Browne et al., 2008; Chard et al.,
2011; Fagg et al., 2012). However, no one has yet compared the evolu-
tion of average patient severity at ISTC-exposed public hospitals with
that at public hospitals unaffected by the ISTC programme, and
shown that ISTC-exposed public hospitals experienced a larger reduc-
tion in average patient health status (measured using a Charlson
Index) than public hospitals not exposed to the entry of an ISTC.
Providing evidence of such an effect of ISTC entry is important because
the case mix differences between ISTCs and nearby public hospitals
documented by the existing literature may simply reﬂect the fact that
ISTCs attracted patients who would not otherwise have undergone
surgery.7
4. Data, deﬁnition of treatment group, and estimation strategy
Our aim is to estimate the causal effect of the entry of private surgical
centres on the efﬁciency, case mix, and case load of nearby incumbent
public hospitals. We use difference-in-difference (DiD) regressions in7 Kelly and Stoye (2016) show that, during the 2000s, the number of NHS-funded hip
replacements increasedmore in areaswhere ISTCswere established than elsewhere. They
explain this relative increase by arguing that the expansion in NHS-funded capacity
brought about by the ISTC programme led patients whowould not otherwise have under-
gone a hip replacement, or whowould have had the procedure performed privately, to in-
stead have their operation performed at an ISTC and funded by the NHS. These patients
newly drawn to treatment via the public system as a result of ISTC entrymay have had dif-
ferent characteristics to those patients that were already being treated in the public sys-
tem. This possibility highlights that the mere existence of differences in average patient
health status between an NHS hospital and a nearby ISTC should not, in itself, be taken
as evidence that ISTC entry imposed negative externalities on the NHS hospital's case
mix via patient selection. In this paper, we therefore measure risk selection by instead
comparing the evolution of average patient health status at NHS hospitals that had an
ISTC enter nearby with the evolution of average patient health status at comparable
NHS hospitals that did not have an ISTC enter nearby.which the impact of ISTC exposure is estimated from the mean change
in outcomes for public hospitals in a treatment group (those that had
a private surgical centre placed nearby) minus the mean change in
outcomes for public hospitals in a control group (those that did not
have a private surgical centre placed nearby) before and after entry
occurred. This section describes our outcome measures, construction
of treatment groups, and identiﬁcation strategy.4.1. Data and outcome variables
Our dataset is derived from the NHSHospital Episode Statistics (HES)
(HSCIC, 2016), which contains the universe of government-funded hos-
pital admissions in England.8 Our data extract consists of all elective hip
and knee replacements on patients aged 55–100 performed between ﬁ-
nancial years 2002/3 and 2008/9 (see Table 1).We focus on hip andknee
replacements for two reasons. First, orthopaedic surgery was a major
focus of the ISTC programme, as it was recognised in the early 2000s
that achieving the government's waiting time targets was going to be
more challenging in this surgical specialty than in any other area
(Harrison and Appleby, 2005). Second, clinical practice in relation to
hip and knee replacements did not change signiﬁcantly during this pe-
riod in ways that could affect LOS. As a result, any observed changes in
LOS will likely be driven by NHS reforms, not by differential uptake of
new medical technologies.
We focus on hip and knee replacements performed in NHS hospitals.
NHS hospital trusts (ﬁrms) often consist ofmultiple hospitals (individual
sites) that can be located up to 100 km away from each other.We there-
fore analyse the data at site (hospital) level rather than trust (ﬁrm) level,
and assign hospitals (sites) to treatment and control groups based on the
site's proximity to the nearest ISTC. All references to ‘hospitals’ in this
paper are therefore to hospital sites, not to trusts (ﬁrms). After cleaning
and imputing missing values for the site code ﬁeld, and applying exclu-
sion criteria detailed below, there are 166 public hospitals treating hip
and knee replacement patients from 2002/3 to 2008/9.
Researchers have generally struggled to quantify hospital efﬁciency.
In the absence of hospital cost data, many studies use proxymeasures of
efﬁciency such as LOS (Fenn and Davies, 1990; Martin and Smith, 1996;
Gaynor et al., 2013). The logic underlying this measure is that, if a hos-
pital can treat patients more quickly without any deterioration in
clinical quality, then it must have become more efﬁcient. However, a
critical shortcoming of overall LOS as an efﬁciency measure is that
recovery time after surgery is also heavily dependent on patient
characteristics and health status. Moreover, a hospital's average LOS
may reﬂect undesirable hospital behaviour such as cream skimming
(prioritising treatment of less costly patients); dumping (avoiding
treatment of costlier patients); and quality skimping (discharging pa-
tients ‘sicker and quicker’) (Epstein et al., 1990; Martin and Smith,
1996; Sudell et al., 1991).
In this study, we use an innovative method to obtain a cleaner proxy
for hospital efﬁciency. We decompose LOS for hip and knee replace-
ments into two parts: the time from admission to surgery (pre-surgery
LOS), and the time from surgery until discharge (post-surgery LOS).We
hypothesise that, for elective orthopaedic surgery, pre-surgery LOS is
not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by patient characteristics, as there is rarely
a clinical rationale for admitting an elective orthopaedic surgery patient
before the scheduled day of their operation. In the early 2000s, fewer
than 20% of hip and knee replacement patients had surgery on the day
they were admitted to the hospital. Patients were often kept overnight
before elective surgery not for clinical reasons, but because operating8 HES should contain data on publicly funded patients treated by private providers, but
data from these providers is incomplete during the periodwe examine (AC andHC, 2008).
However, this does not pose a problem for the present study, as our aim is not to compare
ISTC performance with performance at public hospitals, but rather to use ISTCs as sources
of variation in the competitive environment, in order to estimate the impact of private sur-
gical centre entry on the performance of nearby public hospital incumbents.
Table 2
Share of variation in pre-surgery and post-surgery LOS explained by patient characteristics.
(1) (2)
Pre-surgery LOS Post-surgery LOS
R-squared 0.004 0.128
Notes: Table reports R-squareds from regression of pre-surgery and post-surgery length of
stay on patient characteristics in years 2002/3 to 2008/9. The patient characteristics in-
cluded are: Charlson score; number of diagnoses; IMD income deprivation score; IMD
health and disability deprivation score; dummy variables indicating self-discharge,
urban residence, mixed ethnicity, Asian ethnicity, black ethnicity, other ethnicity, and un-
known ethnicity; and a full set of casemix dummieswith gender interactedwith ﬁve-year
age bins. Table C.1 (SupplementaryMaterial) reports the complete set of coefﬁcients from
these regressions.
10 The Charlson score ranges from 0 to 130. However, only around 8% of patients have a
score above 6. We therefore cap the score at 6, to ensure that our results for this outcome
variable are not driven by outliers.
11 Appendix A provides further information about how hip and knee replacement pa-
tients are identiﬁed, how the LOS-related variables are constructed, and howmissing site
codes are imputed. Separate versions of Table 1 for hip and knee replacements are re-
Table 1
Number of hip and knee replacements in estimation sample and means of key dependent variables.
Year Observations Mean pre-surgery LOS % treated on day of admission Mean post-surgery LOS Mean total LOS Mean Charlson score
2002/3 57,559 0.934 0.157 8.91 9.84 0.701
2003/4 65,116 0.911 0.174 8.26 9.18 0.755
2004/5 65,785 0.846 0.228 7.84 8.69 0.885
2005/6 68,688 0.772 0.297 7.36 8.13 0.96
2006/7 71,043 0.629 0.422 6.82 7.45 1.03
2007/8 74,159 0.433 0.604 6.43 6.86 1.11
2008/9 75,876 0.335 0.700 6.27 6.60 1.20
Total 478,226 0.677 0.384 7.34 8.02 0.964
Notes: Table reports the total number of NHS-funded hip and knee replacements thatmeet our sample restrictions and are performed inNHS facilities that are used in our analytic sample.
Themeans of key outcomes variables are estimated from our analytic sample of data. Table B.1 (Supplementary Material) presents separate versions of this table for hip replacement and
knee replacement. Length of stay is measured in days.
68 Z. Cooper et al. / Journal of Public Economics 166 (2018) 63–80rooms were not available on their scheduled surgery date.9 The extent
to which hospitals are able to schedule patient admissions to ensure
that they line up with the availability of surgeons, support staff, and
operating theatres will therefore be a direct function of the efﬁciency
with which the hospital is run. By contrast, we view post-surgery LOS
as a joint product of underlying hospital efﬁciency and patient
characteristics. Therefore, when we estimate the effect of ISTC entry
on post-surgery LOS, we interpret the results as a combined outcome
of (i) competitive pressure brought about by ISTC entry, leading to
efﬁciency improvements by nearby public incumbents, and (ii) ISTC
cream skimming, leaving nearby public hospitals with a sicker mix of
patients.
To test our hypothesis that pre-surgery LOS is less inﬂuenced by
patient characteristics than post-surgery LOS, we regress pre- and
post-surgery LOS for hip and knee replacements against a range of
patient characteristics. Patient characteristics included in the regression
are: Charlson score; number of diagnoses; Index ofMultiple Deprivation
(IMD) income deprivation score; IMD health and disability deprivation
score; dummy variables indicating self-discharge, urban residence,
mixed ethnicity, Asian ethnicity, black ethnicity, other ethnicity, and
unknown ethnicity; and a full set of case mix dummies with gender
interacted with ﬁve-year age bins. The results, reported in Table 2, are
consistent with our hypothesis – patient characteristics explain less
than half a per cent of the variation in pre-surgery LOS, but 12.8% of
the variation in post-surgery LOS.
We observe changes in patient health status at NHS hospitals before
and after ISTCs enter in order to directlymeasure whether risk selection
occurred. To measure patient health status, we calculate a Charlson
score for each patient. The Charlson score predicts a patient's 10-year
survival probability based on their health status in relation to 17
conditions likely to lead to death. The score varies from 0 to 6, with 09 Personal communicationwith NHS physicians supported this claim.We recognise too
that not all pre-surgery LOS iswasted time and theremay, in rare cases, be clinical reasons
to admit patients before the day of surgery. However, unless this clinical need is correlated
with ISTC treatment status, this issuewill not threaten our strategy for identiﬁcation of the
effects of ISTC treatment on efﬁciency.denoting the absence of any predictors of mortality (HSCIC, 2013).10
As proxies for health status and clinical risk, we also use the patient's
age, as well as the IMD income domain (Noble et al., 2004), which
reports the percentage of households in the patient's residential Lower
Super Output Area (LSOA, a statistical geographical areas containing
around 1500 residents) that are income deprived (in our dataset this
variable ranges from 0 to 83).
The data includes 478,226 hip and knee replacements performed
from 2002/3 to 2008/9 that met the sample restrictions. As Table 1
illustrates, during the analysis period pre-surgery LOS, post-surgery
LOS, and total LOS fell considerably.114.2. Treatment assignment
We assign public hospitals to treatment or control groups based on
their geographical proximity to the new market entrants, on the as-
sumption that exposure to competition from these entrants is a product
of proximity. In particular, we assign treatments by comparing the
distance from an NHS hospital to its nearest ISTC with the percentiles
of distance travelled by that hospital's hip and knee replacement
patients.
We measure the distance travelled by each hip and knee replace-
ment patient to hospital using the centroids of a patient's residential
LSOA to deﬁne home location.We then calculate, for each NHS hospital,
percentiles of patient distance travelled (e.g. the distance that captures
25% of a hospital's hip and knee replacement patients). Percentiles of
patient distance travelled can be endogenous to hospital quality – for
example, a high-quality hospital may attract patients from further
aﬁeld. To ameliorate this concern, we use percentiles of patient distance
travelled based on patient ﬂows from 2002/3 to 2004/5 (i.e. before
implementation of either the ISTC programme or patient choice of
hospital for elective surgery).
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for quantiles of patient
distance travelled and the exposure of NHS hospitals to Wave 1 ISTCs
within each of these quantile bands. Panel A presents the mean
kilometre distances (averaging over theNHShospitals in our estimation
sample) corresponding to these patient percentile travel distances. The
mean value of the 25th percentile of travel distance for hip and knee re-
placement patients is 4.25 km, while for the 95th percentile it isported in Table B.1. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this paper are reported
in Table B.2. Because our results for hip replacements and knee replacements were very
similar, we pooled together these surgical procedures in the estimates reported in the
main body of this paper and included a dummy variable indicating hip replacement, to
capture level differences in the outcome variable across the two surgical procedures.
Tables F.1 to F.4 show that our results are qualitatively unchanged when separate treat-
ment effects are estimated for hip replacements and knee replacements.
Table 3
Patient travel distance percentile groups and kilometre distances.
A. Average kilometre distances corresponding to percentiles in the distribution of patient distance travelled from home to hospital, 2002/3 to 2004/5
Percentile of patient ﬂows 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th
Kilometres 1.46 2.19 4.25 8.24 13.24 21.10 26.34
B. Number of NHS Hospitals with a Wave 1 ISTC within percentiles of patient distance travelled
Percentile of patient ﬂows 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th
NHS hospitals (total number = 166) 8 9 11 16 25 48 62
Notes: Panel A reports themean distances corresponding to percentiles in the distribution of patient distance travelled fromhome to hospital, averaging over the 166NHS hospitals in our
estimation sample. These mean distances are calculated based on percentiles of patient distance travelled in the 3 years before the ISTC programme began (2002/3 to 2004/5). Panel B
reports the number of NHS hospitals with a Wave 1 ISTC within each of these patient distance percentile groups. In our main speciﬁcation, the 25th percentile and 95th percentile are
used to deﬁne the High and Low Treatment groups respectively.
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enter within each of these distance bands.
To deﬁne Treatment and Control groups, we start by assuming that,
if there is no ISTC entrant within an NHS hospital's 95th percentile of
patient distance travelled – a widely-used deﬁnition of market size –
then the NHS hospital is not exposed to the ISTC programme. These
NHS hospitals are assigned to the Control group. We assign the remain-
ing NHS hospitals to discrete treatment groups based on natural breaks
in the distribution of distances from NHS hospital to the nearest ISTC in
our dataset, measured in terms of patient travel percentiles (see Fig. 2).
This assignment yields two discrete treatment groups – a Low Treat-
ment group (ISTC within 95th percentile of patient distance travelled
but not within 25th percentile) and a High Treatment group (ISTC
within 25th percentile of patient distance travelled).12 There are 11
NHS hospitals in the High Treatment group, 51 in the Low Treatment
group and 104 in the Control group. Fig. 3 maps the ISTCs and public
hospitals in our data. In the robustness section, we show the effect of
changing the threshold used to deﬁne the treatment groups on our
estimates.
One obvious concern is that treatment assignment might be endog-
enous to our primary outcome (LOS) because ISTCs may have opened
near inefﬁcient NHS providers. However, as noted earlier, ISTC place-
ment decisions were driven by local NHS hospital waiting times, not
by local hospital LOS or other performance measures. Waiting times
are dependent on a wide range of demand and supply side capacity-
related factors beyond simply hospitals' LOS. As a result, there is little
reason to expect hospitals with high waiting times to necessarily have
high LOS. Indeed, as we observe, hospitals' LOS is uncorrelated with
their waiting times.13
Table 4 illustrates this point by comparing waiting times, total LOS,
pre-surgery LOS, and post-surgery LOS for hip and knee replacement
at High Treatment group, Low Treatment group and Control group hos-
pitals in 2002/3 (the year that ISTC placement decisions were being
made). Average waiting times in 2002/3 were around 6% higher at
High Treatment group hospitals than at hospitals in our other groups.
By contrast, there are no systematic differences between total LOS or
post-surgery LOS at High Treatment group hospitals and others. Pre-
surgery LOS is slightly lower at High Treatment group hospitals – i.e.
ISTCs tended to enter near NHS hospitals that were already slightly
more efﬁcient, although there is no evidence to suggest that these
small efﬁciency differences were a factor in ISTC location decisions. As
we show in later analysis, these differences in pre-surgery LOS are not12 We arrived at these percentile splits using a Jencks Natural Breaks based analysis, im-
plemented with Stata's group1d command. See Appendix A for more details.
13 The correlation between hospitals' average total LOS and average waiting time for hip
and knee replacement surgery in 2002/3 is 0.06, p-value 0.46). Simple bivariate regres-
sions of the log of average total LOS on log of averagewaiting time during this period yield
a tiny and statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient (0.03, p-value 0.275). We take this as evi-
dence that selection for ISTC placement on the basis of the averagewaiting times of nearby
NHS hospitals does not imply selection, via correlation, on the basis of nearby hospitals'
average LOS.associated with any statistically signiﬁcant differences in trends of
pre-surgery between 2002/3 and 2004/5, prior to the entry of ISTCs –
which is the key assumption of our DiD identiﬁcation strategy. The
fact that ISTCs entered where nearby public hospitals were already
more efﬁcientmight be of concern if wewere to ﬁnd that ISTC exposure
led nearby public hospitals to become less efﬁcient, as it might suggest
that mean reversion is driving our results. However, as we ﬁnd the op-
posite (i.e. ISTCs entered near public hospitals that were already more
efﬁcient, and that became even more efﬁcient in relative terms as a re-
sult of ISTC exposure), we have no reason to be concerned that these
small differences in pre-ISTC levels of pre-surgery LOS across treated
and control groups will confound our DiD estimates.
We allocate NHShospitals to treatment categories by comparing dis-
tance to ISTC with percentiles of patient distance travelled, not with
kilometre distances, to control for rural-urban differences – treatment
assignment based on ﬁxed distances will over-estimate the size of
markets in urban areas relative to rural areas, given the impact of
urban congestion on travel speeds. In the robustness tests, we examine
whether our results change if we use a treatment assignment strategy
based on ﬁxed distances from public hospital to ISTC.
4.3. Treatment start and end dates
There is some ambiguity as to the appropriate way to deﬁne the
policy-on and policy-off dates for a given public hospital exposed to
ISTC entry. As the ﬁrst ISTCs in our analysis opened in April 2005
(ﬁnancial year 2005/6), we deﬁne 2004/5 as the last pre-treatment
(pre-ISTC-programme) ﬁnancial year.14 However, some ISTCs did not
begin operations until 6 months to a year after their contracted start
date. Moreover, when the initial ISTC contracts (generally around 4 or
5 years in length) were completed, some managed to secure further
contracts, but others were shut down or absorbed into neighbouring
NHS trusts. The fate of an ISTC was generally announced in the last
year of the contract. Thus, if contract end date were used as treatment
end date, estimates of treatment effects could be confounded by
changes in behaviour due to anticipated contract completion.
In response to these ambiguities, we employ a long differences
speciﬁcation using data from the 2004/5 and 2008/9 ﬁnancial years.
We choose 2004/5 as the pre-treatment period in ourmain speciﬁcation
because it is the last year before the ﬁrst contract start date amongst the
ISTCs we use for treatment assignment, and thus most likely to capture
the effect of ISTC exposure as distinct from the effect of other elements
of the government's reform programme.We choose 2008/9 as the post-
treatment period to allow time for treatment effects to be realised,
while avoiding contamination from responses to announcements
concerning extension or non-extension of ISTC contracts. For14 All references to years in this paper are to ﬁnancial years. ThreeWave 1 ISTCs had con-
tract start dates before April 2005 but are not included in our analysis, either because they
did not have (sufﬁcient) orthopaedic capacity or because of ambiguity over location and
differentiation from a nearby NHS hospital. See Appendix A for further details.
15 Thus, while our second speciﬁcation estimates the effect of ISTC exposure on public
hospital performance inclusive of any effects via changing patient characteristics (e.g.
due to risk selection of patients by ISTCs), our third speciﬁcation estimates the effect of
ISTC exposure on public hospital performance conditional on observable patient
characteristics.
Fig. 3.Map of ISTCs and NHS hospitals. Notes: Figure shows the geographic location of the
NHS hospitals included in our regression sample, and the 19 ISTCs used to deﬁne
treatment exposure. NHS hospitals not included in our analysis (for example, because
their nearest ISTC had no orthopaedic capacity or was a Phase 2 ISTC) are not depicted on
the map. In some cases, Low Treatment Group hospitals are further from an ISTC than
some Control group hospitals, because treatment assignment is performed using the
percentiles of patient distance travelled at NHS hospitals, not at ISTCs themselves. NHS
hospitals located very close to an ISTC and not assigned to the High Treatment group are
generally located in urban areas, where the 25th percentile of patient distance travelled
(the threshold used to deﬁne the High Treatment group) can be a very short distance.
Fig. 2. Proximity of public hospitals to Wave 1 ISTCs, measured in terms of percentiles of
patient distance travelled. Notes: Figure shows the distribution of public hospitals'
proximity to private specialty surgical centre entrants (ISTCs), measured in terms of
equivalents to percentiles of patient distance travelled to hospital, with the patient's
Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) of residence used as a proxy for home address. Public
hospitals were grouped into discrete treatment groups based on natural breaks in the
distribution of treatment intensities – a High Treatment group for public hospitals
whose nearest ISTC was closer than the 25th percentile of patient distance travelled, and
a Low Treatment group for public hospitals whose nearest ISTC was closer than the 95th
percentile of patient distance travelled, but further away than the 25th percentile.
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post-reform years from 2005/6 to 2008/9, and report estimates that de-
ﬁne a public hospital's treatment start date as the contract start date of
its nearest ISTC.
4.4. Regression speciﬁcation
We identify the impact of hospital market entry using a DiD re-
gression framework where dummy variables indicating treatment
group membership are interacted with a post-policy dummy, which
is switched on for the 2008/9 ﬁnancial year. Regressions are run at
the patient level and any non-binary dependent variables are log-
transformed (after adding 1 to any variables that have a minimum
value of zero) such that the treatment effects are interpretable as per-
centage changes.
Our basic DiD speciﬁcation is:
yijt ¼ β0 þ β1postt þ β2highj þ β3lowj þ β4 highj  postt
 
þ β5 lowj  postt
 þ εijt ð1Þ
In this speciﬁcation, t denotes the time period (ﬁnancial year),
postt ∈ {0,1} denotes whether an observation occurs in the post-
reform period, yijt denotes the outcome variable under consideration
for patient i attending hospital j at time t, and highj and lowj denote
dummies for the High and Low Treatment groups respectively. Treat-
ment effects are given by the coefﬁcients on the interaction terms, β4
and β5. We also include a dummy in our regressions to control for the
type of procedure a patient undergoes (hip or knee surgery) but
suppress this in the notation for simplicity.
Our second speciﬁcation includes hospital ﬁxed effects (μj) in place
of the treatment group indicators to capture all time-invariant hospital
and spatial characteristics, and time-period-speciﬁc (month-year) ﬁxed
effects (ηt) in place of the post-policy period dummy:
yijt ¼ β0 þ β1 highj  postt
 
þ β2 lowj  postt
 þ ηt þ μ j þ εijt ð2ÞOur third speciﬁcation is identical to (2), but includes an extensive
set of controls for patient and hospital characteristics.15 All speciﬁca-
tions are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), with standard
errors clustered at the hospital level to account for correlation in unob-
servables within hospitals (between patients and over time).
There are two core threats to our identiﬁcation strategy. The ﬁrst is
that trends in outcome variables may not have been parallel between
treatment and control groups prior to ISTC entry. The second is that
there may have been other time-varying policy changes that also
affected outcomes concurrently with the ISTC programme. To address
the ﬁrst possibility, we demonstrate that treated and control hospitals
had parallel trends for our key dependent variables before the ISTC
programme was launched by showing trends in the data graphically,
and formally testing for statistically signiﬁcant differences in trends.
To address the risk that concurrent and correlated policy shocks drive
our results, Section 5.4 discusses the two most prominent policy
16 We deliberately choose not to study the effect of ISTC entry on nearby public hospital
waiting times in themain body of this paper because ISTCs were strategically located near
hospitals with high waiting times, implying that treatment is endogenous with respect to
this outcome variable. Nevertheless, for interested readers, the Appendix I presents graph-
ical evidence concerning the evolution of waiting times at treatment and control group
hospitals, and DiD estimates corresponding to this graphical evidence. The accompanying
text explains in further detail why our DiD estimates cannot be interpreted as causal ef-
fects of ISTC entry on waiting times.
Table 4
Comparison of performance indicators at high treatment group, low treatment group and control group hospitals in 2002/3.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High treatment group Low treatment group Control group Low treatment group + control group
Waiting times 271.4 248.5 259.8 256
Length of stay 9.985 9.843 10.14 10.04
Pre-surgery length of stay 0.889 0.923 0.925 0.925
Post-surgery length of stay 9.096 8.920 9.214 9.119
Notes: Table reports average waiting times, total length of stay (LOS), pre-surgery LOS, and post-surgery LOS for hip and knee replacement patients at treatment and control group hos-
pitals in 2002/3 (i.e. before commencement of the ISTC programme).
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ISTC entry – the introduction of hospital competition via patient choice
of hospital for elective surgery, and the enactment of differential health
policies by Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) – and illustrates that
controlling for these policy changes does not materially inﬂuence our
main estimates.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive evidence
Fig. 4 presents the evolution of key outcome variables – pre-surgery
LOS, percentage treated on day of admission, post-surgery LOS, total LOS
and Charlson score – between 2002/3 and 2008/9, for treatment and
control groups. The shaded area represents the range of treatment
start dates for the Wave 1 ISTCs. We expect that any treatment effects
will arise either within the time period captured by shaded region or,
if behavioural responses took place with a lag, some time thereafter.
Each data point represents a month, but the plots are smoothed using
a moving average of the month and the previous quarter. These graphs
allow visual examination of whether treated and control groups
followed similar trends prior to the entry of ISTCs.
Panel A shows changes in pre-surgery LOS and illustrates that High
Treatment group, Low Treatment group, and Control group hospitals
follow similar trends before ISTC entry. Over and above a secular
downward trend, reﬂecting general improvements in turnaround
time, there is evidence of a treatment effect from ISTC entry. After
ISTC entry, trends diverge, and by the end of the treatment period the
reduction in pre-surgery LOS is notably larger for the High Treatment
group than for the Control group. There also appears to be a smaller
effect for the Low Treatment group. Panel B shows trends in the
percentage of patients treated on the day of admission. All three groups
have similar pre-entry trends, but after ISTC entry the percentage of
patients treated on the day of admission increases more quickly for
High Treatment group hospitals. Overall, Panels A and B provide visual
evidence that the entry of private specialty surgical centres in the
English NHS made nearby public hospitals more efﬁcient, by reducing
pre-surgery delays.
Panel C shows trends in post-surgery LOS, which have a markedly
different pattern. The High Treatment group, Low Treatment group,
and Control group hospitals have similar pre-entry trends. However,
there is a sharp increase in post-surgery LOS for the High Treatment
group from the middle of the ISTC entry period onwards. Overall, after
ISTC entry post-surgery LOS decreases in the High Treatment group
less than in the Control group. Panel D presents trends in total LOS,
which follow a similar pattern to post-surgery LOS. As discussed in
Section 4.1, post-surgery LOS (and therefore total LOS) will be
inﬂuenced both by changes in hospital efﬁciency due to increased
competitive pressure from the entry of private surgical centres, and by
changes in patient characteristics due to cream skimming by entrants.
Panels C and D therefore provide suggestive evidence that the negative
impact of ISTC cream skimming on nearby public hospitals' LOS may
have outweighed any efﬁciency improvements with respect to LOS
arising from competitive pressure from these new market entrants.Panel E looks more directly at the impacts of ISTC entry on public
hospitals' casemix by plotting the evolution of average Charlson scores.
The pre-policy levels and trends of the Charlson score are similar across
treatment and control groups. However, the High Treatment group
starts receiving sicker patients from early in the ISTC entry period.
This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that selection of less
risky patients by ISTCs left a residual pool of higher-risk patients to be
treated by public hospitals. Graphical evidence for other case mix
variables is presented Appendix D.
Overall, the similar pre-policy trends in treatment and control
groups for all outcome variables provides strong support for our
argument that DiD estimates are likely to provide an unbiased estimate
of treatment effects from ISTC entry. The fact that pre-policy trends (and
inmany cases levels) of our outcome variables are similar across treated
and untreated groups is consistentwith our argument that the principal
target of ISTC placement was to reduce waiting times for admission to
hospital, not to reduce time spent in hospital or to improve clinical
quality.165.2. Regression-based difference-in-difference estimates
Table 5 presents our main difference-in-difference estimates of the
effect of ISTC entry on log of pre-surgery LOS, percentage of patients
treated on day of admission, and log of post-surgery LOS. The sample
includes hip and knee replacements, with a hip replacement dummy
included to account for level differences in outcomes between the two
procedures.
In Columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is log of pre-surgery
LOS. Column (1) presents estimates of Eq. (1), without hospital ﬁxed
effects or patient controls. The estimate implies that ISTC entry led to
a 14.4% (=100(e−0.156− 1)) reduction in pre-surgery LOS. In Column
(2), we estimate Eq. (2), adding hospital and month × year ﬁxed
effects. The results are qualitatively unchanged and imply that ISTC
entry led to a 16.1% reduction in pre-surgery LOS. In Column (3), we
add patient controls and the results again remain qualitatively
unchanged (we ﬁnd a 16.6% reduction). That controlling for patient
characteristics barely shifts the estimated treatment effects for the
High Treatment group suggests that there is little selection into treat-
ment on the basis of these observable demographic characteristics.
This, in turn, implies that there is likely to be little selection into treat-
ment on the basis of unobservable patient characteristics (Altonji et al.,
2005). The impact on the Low Treatment group is of the same sign and
around one third the magnitude of the High Treatment group effect,
but is imprecisely measured and never signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. The most likely interpretation is that there were moderate
Fig. 4. Trends in key outcomes variables. Notes: Sample includes hip and knee replacement patients. Treatment groups are as deﬁned in Table 5 notes. Graphs show moving averages of
hospital means calculated over a month and the previous quarter. Shaded area marks main period of Wave 1 ISTC entry. Figs. F.1 and F.2 provide versions of ﬁgures for hip replacement
patients and knee replacement patients separately.
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search design does not have sufﬁcient power to detect them.
Columns (4) to (6) examine the effect of ISTC entry on the propor-
tion of patients who were treated on the day of admission. The resultsare similar with and without hospital ﬁxed effects, and with and
without patient controls. The results in Column (5), which estimates
Eq. (2), shows that ISTC entry led to a 24.3 percentage point reduction
in the proportion of patients treated on the day of admission at High
Table 5
Impact of ISTC entry on length of stay at nearby public hospitals (treatment deﬁned using patient ﬂows).
Log of pre-surgery length of stay % treated on day of admission Log of post-surgery length of stay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
High treatment × post −0.156⁎⁎ −0.176⁎⁎⁎ −0.181⁎⁎⁎ 0.217⁎⁎ 0.243⁎⁎⁎ 0.248⁎⁎⁎ 0.0813⁎ 0.0482 0.0242
(0.0636) (0.0659) (0.0663) (0.0886) (0.0917) (0.0919) (0.0481) (0.0498) (0.0445)
Low treatment × post −0.0455 −0.0642 −0.0649 0.0648 0.0912 0.0916 0.0478 0.0505⁎ 0.0434
(0.0480) (0.0459) (0.0465) (0.0682) (0.0656) (0.0662) (0.0312) (0.0296) (0.0311)
Hospital ﬁxed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Month × year controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Patient controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 141,661 141,661 141,443 141,661 141,661 141,443 141,661 141,661 141,443
R-squared 0.204 0.394 0.401 0.228 0.445 0.450 0.064 0.121 0.260
Mean dependent var 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.228 0.228 0.228 7.84 7.84 7.84
Notes: Sample includes hip and knee replacement patients. High and Low Treatment groups are deﬁned using percentiles of patient distance travelled in 2002/3 to 2004/5. Treatment
groups are: High – hospitals with Wave 1 ISTC within their 25th percentile patient travel distance; Low – hospitals with a Wave 1 ISTC between their 25th and 95th percentile patient
travel distance; Untreated – hospitals without an ISTC in their 95th percentile patient travel distance. Our pre-reformperiod is 2004/5; our post-reform period is 2008/9.Mean Dependent
Variable reports the average value of the outcomevariable (not logged) in our pre-reformperiod, 2004/5. Standard errors are clustered at thehospital level. ⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01, ⁎⁎p b 0.05, ⁎ p b 0.1.
All regressions include a dummy variable indicating hip replacement. The regressions in Columns (1), (4) and (7) include dummy variables indicating the High Treatment group, Low
Treatment group and post-reform period. Coefﬁcients on these variables are always near-zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. Table E.1 reports coefﬁcient estimates for these variables.
The speciﬁcations reported in Columns (3), (6) and (9) include Charlson score; number of diagnoses; IMD income deprivation score; IMD health and disability deprivation score;
dummy variables indicating procedure type (hip replacement cemented, hip replacement uncemented, revision to hip replacement, knee procedure revisions); indicators for self-dis-
charge, urban residence, mixed ethnicity, Asian ethnicity, black ethnicity, other ethnicity, and unknown ethnicity; and a full set of case mix dummies with gender interacted with ﬁve-
year age bins. Table E.3 reports coefﬁcient estimates for these variables. Tables F.1 and F.2 report separate estimates for hip replacements and knee replacements respectively.
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pre-surgery LOS, the impact on the Low Treatment group is same-
signed, smaller, and never signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Columns (7) to (9) present estimates of the effect of ISTC entry on
post-surgery LOS. In Column (7), we estimate that the entry of ISTCs
led to an 8.47% increase in post-surgery LOS at High Treatment group
hospitals. However, this effect is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The
precision and magnitude of our estimates is reduced when hospital
and month × year ﬁxed effects are included, in Column (8). Adding
patient controls further reduces the size of the point estimate and de-
creases precision, as we would expect if patient characteristics affect
post-surgery LOS and it is selection of less riskier patients into ISTCs
and out of NHS hospitals which drives the treatment effects on post-
surgery LOS. That patient controls reduce the magnitude of the post-
surgery LOS estimates, but have little impact on the pre-surgery LOS
estimates, provides further evidence that patient characteristics are a
major driver of post-surgery LOS, but have little inﬂuence on pre-
surgery LOS.
We interpret changes in post-surgery LOS resulting from ISTC entry
as a joint product of (i) changes in the mix of patients being treated by
public hospitals, due to cream skimming by neighbouring ISTCs and (ii)
behavioural responses by public hospital managers and clinicians to
competition from new private entrants. Although only signiﬁcant at
the 10% level, the estimates in Column (7) suggest that the increases
in post-surgery LOS generated by cream-skimming were larger than
the reduction in LOS generated from any efﬁciency gains in terms of
the total time patients spent in the hospital.
An important point to note, in relation to the results presented in
Table 5, is that the unreported coefﬁcients on the High Treatment and
Low Treatment indicators in Columns (1), (4) and (7) are always
near-zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. For example, in Column
(1) the coefﬁcient on the High Treatment variable is 0.0308 (0.0442).
These results imply that the treatment and control groups are balanced
in terms of the pre-treatment, 2004/5 levels of the outcomes under
investigation, consistent with the graphical evidence in Fig. 4 discussed
above.17
Table 6 tests for cream skimming directly by assessing whether the
entry of an ISTC left nearby public hospitals with a riskier mix of17 The coefﬁcients on the High Treatment and Low Treatment indicators are reported in
Table E.1 of Appendix E.patients. We estimate Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) with hospital and month
× year ﬁxed effects; no speciﬁcations include patient controls. Columns
(1) to (4) indicate that ISTC entry led to an 11.6% increase in the average
Charlson score of patients at High Treatment group hospitals – or a 6.2
percentage point increase in the proportion of patients with a Charlson
score of three or more – signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Column (5) indicates
that ISTC entry led to a 5.54% increase in the IMD income deprivation
score at High Treatment group hospitals, although this point estimate
reduces in magnitude and becomes imprecise when hospital and
month × year ﬁxed effects are added. We do not ﬁnd that ISTC entry
led to a precisely estimated increase in patient age at nearby NHS
hospitals.
Table 7 presents event study estimates of year-by-year effects of
ISTC entry on log of pre-surgery LOS, percentage of patients treated
on day of admission, and log of Charlson score at exposed NHS hospi-
tals, from 2004/5 to 2008/9. The estimates mirror our graphical evi-
dence in Fig. 4 and show that ISTC entry had a statistically signiﬁcant
effect on these outcomes at exposed NHS hospitals from 2007/8
onwards.
Appendix J explores the impact of ISTC entry on clinical quality at
NHS hospitals by analysing changes in 30-day in-hospital mortality
from acute myocardial infarction (AMI) at nearby public hospitals.
We ﬁnd that, after controlling for patient characteristics, ISTC entry
did not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on AMI mortality at
nearby public hospitals. The results suggest that the efﬁciency
improvements reported in Columns (1) to (6) of Table 5 were
achieved without any evidence of concomitant deterioration in clini-
cal quality.
5.3. Treatment assignment using ﬁxed distances
Table 8 presents estimates of the effect of ISTC entrywhen treatment
assignment is based not on patient ﬂows but on ﬁxed kilometre
distances between ISTCs and NHS hospitals. Speciﬁcally, the High
Treatment group comprises NHS hospitals that had an ISTC enterwithin
5 km, the Low Treatment group comprises NHS hospitals that had an
ISTC enter within 30 km (but not within 5 km), and the Control group
comprises NHS hospitals that did not have an ISTC enter within
30 km. Using this deﬁnition, the High Treatment group contains 14 hos-
pitals, the Low Treatment group 78 hospitals, and the Control group 77
hospitals. Table 8 indicates that ISTC entry within 5 km of an NHS
Table 6
Impact of ISTC entry on case mix at nearby public hospitals (treatment deﬁned using patient ﬂows).
Log of Charlson score Charlson score of 3 or more Log of IMD income
deprivation score
Log of age
(coefﬁcients × 100)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High treatment × post 0.111⁎⁎ 0.110⁎⁎ 0.0628⁎⁎ 0.0618⁎⁎ 0.0539⁎⁎ 0.00803 0.281 0.199
(0.0522) (0.0528) (0.0297) (0.0301) (0.0254) (0.0259) (0.294) (0.259)
Low treatment × post −0.00387 0.00597 −0.000865 0.00499 −0.0266 −0.0150 0.164 0.116
(0.0244) (0.0246) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0262) (0.0154) (0.182) (0.182)
Hospital ﬁxed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Month × year ﬁxed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 141,661 141,661 141,661 141,661 141,443 141,443 141,661 141,661
R-squared 0.008 0.035 0.008 0.035 0.019 0.174 0.000 0.011
Mean dependent variable 0.885 0.885 0.205 0.205 11.6 11.6 71.3 71.3
Notes: Sample includes hip and knee replacementpatients. Treatment groups, pre-reformand post-reformperiod,meandependent variable, standard errors and statistical signiﬁcance are
deﬁned as in the Table 5 notes. All regressions include a dummy variable indicating hip replacement. In addition, the regressions in Columns (1), (3) and (5) and (7) include dummy var-
iables indicating the High Treatment group, Low Treatment group and post-reform period. Coefﬁcients for these variables are reported in Table E.2. Tables F.3 and F.4 report separate es-
timates for hip replacements and knee replacements respectively.
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point increase in the share of patients treated on the day of admission,
and an 11.2% increase in the average Charlson score.Table 7
Event study analysis of the impact of ISTC entry on length of stay and case mix.
(1) (2) (3)
Log of
pre-surgery LOS
% treated on day
of admission
Log of Charlson
score
High treatment × 2005/6 −0.00843 0.0114 0.0127
(0.0405) (0.0566) (0.0284)
High treatment × 2006/7 −0.0904 0.127 0.0647
(0.0776) (0.107) (0.0426)
High treatment × 2007/8 −0.149⁎ 0.205⁎ 0.0868
(0.0798) (0.111) (0.0597)
High treatment × 2008/9 −0.171⁎⁎ 0.236⁎⁎ 0.105⁎⁎
(0.0661) (0.0921) (0.0520)
Low treatment × 2005/6 −0.0129 0.0214 −0.0108
(0.0203) (0.0291) (0.0149)
Low treatment × 2006/7 −0.0369 0.0552 −0.0103
(0.0358) (0.0510) (0.0204)
Low treatment × 2007/8 −0.0658 0.0961 0.0248
(0.0444) (0.0633) (0.0228)
Low treatment × 2008/9 −0.0554 0.0791 0.00440
(0.0450) (0.0642) (0.0240)
Hospital ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Month × year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Patient controls No No No
Observations 355,551 355,551 355,5515.4. Controlling for contemporaneous NHS policy changes
One concernwith our DiD identiﬁcation strategy is that the resulting
estimates may be biased by other policies, implemented concurrently
with the ISTC programme, that had a differential effect on our outcome
variables across treated and control groups. The most prominent such
policy is the 2006 introduction of hospital competition within the NHS
via patient choice of hospital for elective surgery. In addition, during
this era much NHS policy was dictated by ten regional Strategic Health
Authorities (SHAs) – differences in SHA policies implemented during
the ISTC period may bias our results, to the extent that ISTC entry was
differentiated across regions of England. We investigate these possibili-
ties in Table 9; all reported estimates use as their baseline Eq. (2).
Columns (1) to (3) test whether the estimates reported in Tables 5
and 6 are robust to controlling for the 2006 patient choice reforms.
We control for overall competition intensity by including a measure of
market concentration (a time-invariant negative log of hospital HHI)
interacted with a post-ISTC-entry dummy variable.18 If the patient
choice reforms were driving the results, inclusion of this interaction
term would severely attenuate our estimates. However, including this
interaction term does not materially change the estimates – they
remain precisely estimated and similar in magnitude.
Columns (4) to (6) test for other region-speciﬁc policy changes that
could be driving our results. To do so, we interact dummies for each of
the ten English SHAs with a post-ISTC-entry dummy. These additional
controls do not materially impact our results. The results are also robust
to controlling more ﬂexibly for differential SHA policies and regional
trends via separate SHA × year or SHA × year × month interaction
terms (see Appendix G). Overall, the estimates reported in Table 9
provide assurance that our main estimates are not driven by the most
worrisome potential sources of bias from contemporaneous policy
changes.18 Wemeasure competition intensity by the negative log of a hospital-speciﬁc, hospital-
centred Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index or HHI (sum of squared market shares), where each
hospital's market is deﬁned as the circle corresponding to the radius formed by the dis-
tance travelled for treatment by the hospital's 95th percentile hip and knee replacement
patient from 2002/3 to 2004/5 (i.e. prior to ISTC entry). We capture competition intensity
using the average pre-reform level of market structure, rather than a time-varying mea-
sure, becausemeasures of market concentration after the introduction of choice and com-
petition will be an endogenous function of the responses of market participants to the
policieswhose effects wewish to control for.We show in Table G.1 that our results are ro-
bust to using a time-varying measure of market concentration.5.5. Altering the threshold used to deﬁne treatment exposure
So far, we have deﬁned the High Treatment group to include any
public hospital that had an ISTC enter within the 25th percentile of
patient distance travelled between 2002/3 and 2004/5, or, in the
alternative speciﬁcation reported in Table 8, within 5 km. Figs. 5 and 6
show how the estimates of Eq. (2) change as we vary the treatment
group deﬁnition thresholds. Fig. 5 (Panel A for log of pre-surgery LOS
and Panel B for log of Charlson score) shows how the estimates change
when the threshold used to deﬁne the treatment group changes from
one that captures 15% of a hospital's hip and knee replacement patients,
to one that captures 95%. Panels A and B illustrate that the estimated
treatment effects decrease as the treated group is deﬁned more widely.R-squared 0.353 0.398 0.030
Mean dependent variable 0.846 0.228 0.885
Notes: Sample includes hip and knee replacement patients. Table reports treatment effects
in the 4 years after commencement of the ISTC programme, with 2004/5 used as the base
year. Treatment groups, mean dependent variable, standard errors and statistical signiﬁ-
cance are deﬁned as in the Table 5 notes. The reported treatment effects are not cumulative
(e.g. the coefﬁcient on High Treatment × 2005/6 is not turned on for observations in years
after 2005/6). The coefﬁcients on High Treatment × 2008/9 and Low Treatment × 2008/9
estimate the same effect as our main results reported in Tables 5 and 6, but differ slightly
because the estimated hospital ﬁxed effects are different due to the inclusion of additional
years of data. All regressions include a dummy variable indicating hip replacement.
19 Hospital-level characteristics used to predict treatment assignment include local hos-
pital waiting times, hip and knee replacement case load, and dummy variables for – lo-
cated in London, teaching hospital, standard acute hospital, university hospital. Average
hip and knee replacement patient characteristics used include mortality rates, total LOS,
pre-surgery LOS, post-surgery LOS, Charlson score, IMD income deprivation score, IMD
health and disability deprivation score, and IMD overall deprivation ranking.
Table 8
Impact of ISTC entry on length of stay and case mix (treatment deﬁned using straight-line
distances between public hospitals and ISTCs).
(1) (2) (3)
Log of
pre-surgery LOS
% treated on day
of admission
Log of Charlson
score
High treatment × post −0.159⁎⁎ 0.219⁎⁎ 0.106⁎⁎
(0.0676) (0.0942) (0.0534)
Low treatment × post −0.0180 0.0263 0.00169
(0.0437) (0.0621) (0.0256)
Hospital ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Month × year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Patient controls No No No
Observations 141,453 141,453 141,453
R-squared 0.396 0.446 0.036
Mean dependent variable 0.846 0.228 0.885
Notes: Sample includes hip and knee replacement patients. The High and Low Treatment
groups are deﬁned using straight-line distances from public hospital to ISTC. The High
Treatment group consists of NHS hospitals that had a Wave 1 ISTC enter within the circle
deﬁned by a 5 km radius. The Low Treatment group consists of NHS hospitals that had a
Wave 1 ISTC enterwithin the circle deﬁned by a 30 km radius, but notwithin the circle de-
ﬁned by a 5 km radius. The Control group consists of NHS hospitals that did not have an
ISTC enterwithin the circle deﬁned by a 30 km radius. Pre-reform and post-reformperiod,
mean dependent variable, standard errors and statistical signiﬁcance are deﬁned as in the
Table 5 notes. All regressions include a dummy variable indicating hip replacement.
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using ﬁxed distances from NHS hospital to ISTC, as in Table 8. Panel A
shows that ISTC entry within 5 km of an NHS hospital leads to a
precisely estimated reduction in log of pre-surgery LOS at incumbents.
As the threshold used to deﬁne the treatment group increases, the
estimated treatment effects lose precision and asymptote to zero.
Panel B, for log of Charlson score, shows a similar sensitivity to the
threshold used to deﬁne treatment exposure. ISTC entry within 5 km
of an NHS hospital leads to a large and statistically signiﬁcant increase
in the average Charlson score at incumbents, with estimated treatment
effects decreasing as the distance to ISTC used to deﬁne the treatment
group increases.
Overall, Figs. 5 and 6 demonstrate that our estimated treatment
effects are robust to the exact threshold used to deﬁne treatment
exposure. Furthermore, as the treatment group is expanded, there is a
negative gradient to our estimates, which is broadly supportive of the
argument that our estimated treatment effects are driven by ISTC
exposure.
5.6. Additional tests of robustness
Table 10 reports additional robustness tests for our main estimates
of the impact of ISTC entry on log of pre-surgery LOS, percentage of pa-
tients treated on day of admission, and log of Charlson score at High
Treatment group hospitals.We estimate Eq. (2) unless otherwise noted.
Panel A formally tests for parallel pre-reform trends for the High
Treatment group relative to the Control group using a ‘placebo’ DiD
regression where 2002/3 is the base year and 2004/5 (the last year
before ISTC entry) is the treated year. This regression allows us to
explore whether there was a statistically signiﬁcant difference in the
change in key outcomes in our High Treatment group relative to the
change in key outcomes for the Control group during our pre-period
from 2002/3 to 2004/5. If there were statistically signiﬁcant differences
(i.e. a ‘placebo’ treatment effect), it would illustrate that there was a
difference in trends over the pre-reform period that would potentially
invalidate our identiﬁcation strategy. Consistent with the graphical
evidence in Fig. 4, none of the 2002/3 to 2004/5 point estimates are
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, conﬁrming that there
were no statistically signiﬁcance differences in trends for key outcomes
between our control group and high treatment group from 2002/3 to2004/5 (our pre-period). Though not reported, we also ﬁnd no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant treatment effects for the Low Treatment group relative
to the Control group over the same period.
To address any residual concerns about comparability of treated and
untreated hospitals, Panel B reports inverse propensity score weighted
estimates where we weight our treatment and control groups by the
inverse of the probability that an observation belongs in its group. To
do this, we ﬁrst calculate the probability of a hospital being assigned
to the High and Low Treatment groups based on hospital and average
patient characteristics.19 We then run separate regressions to estimate
treatment effects for the High and Low Treatment groups, using as
probability weights the inverse of the probability of assignment to the
group that the observationwas actually assigned to.While it is impossi-
ble to reject a null hypothesis of no signiﬁcant differences between
treated and control groups with respect to the above determinants of
treatment assignment even before theseweights are applied, weighting
by the inverse propensity score increases the similarity of the treated
and control groups further still, by giving higher weight to control
observations that look more like treated observations, and vice versa.
The resulting estimates are similar to the headline ﬁndings, but more
precise. The corresponding (unreported) estimates for the Low
Treatment group are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Our main speciﬁcation accounts for the fact that different ISTCs
commenced operations at different times by using a long differences
estimation strategy with 2004/5 as the pre-reform year and 2008/9 as
the post-reform year. An alternative approach is to deﬁne t = 0 (the
treatment start date) for each public hospital as the contract start
month (or month of ‘full service commencement’) of the nearest ISTC,
and to use pre- and post-reform periods deﬁned relative to t=0 rather
than using calendar time. We do not use this as our main speciﬁcation
because the contract start date is not always an accurate indicator of
when an ISTC started treating patients. Nonetheless, Panel C presents
estimates from such a speciﬁcation, with months −12 to −1 before
ISTC entry designated as the pre-reform period, and months 24 to 35
after entry designated as the post-reform period. Hospitals in the
Control group are allocated a placebo ‘treatment’ start date equal to
the contract start date of the nearest ISTC, even though this ISTC lies
outside the 95th percentile of patient distance travelled. The resulting
estimates are very similar to our main results.
Panel D reports estimates using a treatment assignment strategy that
centres hospital markets on GP surgeries rather than hospitals. Hospital-
centredmeasures of market size based on percentiles of patient distance
travelled are potentially endogenous to hospital performance. While we
address this concern by basing treatment assignment on percentiles of
patient distance travelled between2002/3 and 2004/5 –before the intro-
duction of patient choice of hospital or the ISTC programme – concerns
may remain. To address these concerns, this check assigns treatments
by constructing a list of all the NHS hospitals and ISTCs that fall within
each GP surgery's market (95th percentile of distance from GP surgery
toNHShospital for that GP surgery's hip and knee replacement patients).
If an ISTC is in 95% of the GP surgery markets that an NHS hospital falls
within, that NHS hospital is assigned to the High Treatment group. If an
ISTC is in 75% of the GP surgerymarkets that anNHS hospital falls within,
but not 95%, that NHS hospital is assigned to the Low Treatment group.
All other NHS hospitals are assigned to the Control group. The estimates
reported in Panel D are consistentwith ourmain results, providing assur-
ance that they are not driven by assignment of treatments based on
hospital-centred market deﬁnitions.
Table 9
Robustness: impact of ISTC entry on length of stay and case mix – controlling for contemporaneous policy changes.
Controlling for introduction of choice and competition Controlling for changes in strategic health authority (SHA) policy &
differential regional trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of pre-surgery
LOS
% treated on day of
admission
Log of Charlson
score
Log of pre-surgery
LOS
% treated on day of
admission
Log of Charlson
score
High treatment × post −0.175⁎⁎⁎ 0.243⁎⁎⁎ 0.112⁎⁎ −0.132⁎⁎ 0.180⁎⁎ 0.116⁎⁎
(0.0663) (0.0920) (0.0518) (0.0618) (0.0859) (0.0504)
Low treatment × post −0.0589 0.0856 0.0184 −0.0261 0.0353 0.0299
(0.0548) (0.0784) (0.0251) (0.0473) (0.0680) (0.0244)
NegLogHHI × post Yes Yes Yes No No No
SHA × post-dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Hospital ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patient controls No No No No No No
Observations 141,661 141,661 141,661 141,661 141,661 141,661
R-squared 0.394 0.445 0.035 0.400 0.453 0.036
Mean dependent variable 0.846 0.228 0.885 0.846 0.228 0.885
Notes: Sample includes hip and knee replacement patients. Columns (1) to (3) control for the 2006 introduction of hospital competition by including a control for overall competition
intensity (Negative Log of HHI × Dummy variable indicating period after introduction of competition). Columns (4) to (6) control for changes in policy at the Strategic Health Authority
(SHA) level, and for differential regional trends generally, by including controls (the coefﬁcients on which are not included) for SHA (region of England) × Dummy variable indicating
period after introduction of ISTC programme. Treatment groups, pre-reform and post-reform period, mean dependent variable, standard errors and statistical signiﬁcance are deﬁned
as in the Table 5 notes. All regressions include a dummy variable indicating hip replacement. Table G.1 provides alternative speciﬁcations of these robustness tests.
76 Z. Cooper et al. / Journal of Public Economics 166 (2018) 63–80Panel E reports estimates when we do not take logs of the outcome
variables (pre-surgery LOS and Charlson score). We continue to ﬁnd
that ISTC entry made nearby public hospitals more efﬁcient, but also
left them with sicker patients; the estimates are nearly equal to the
exponent of our main results. A number of other checks are reported
in the online Supplementary Material (see Appendices E through G);
they provide further conﬁrmation that our results are robust to a wide
range of speciﬁcations.20 Increases in local capacity could potentially affect the efﬁciency of incumbents even in
the absence of case load reductions at these incumbents. For example, ISTC entrymayhave
reduced pressure on waiting lists at nearby public hospitals, thus making it easier for in-
cumbents to meet the national waiting time targets. If these incumbents had previously
been avoiding target breaches by admitting patients inappropriately early and then mak-
ing themwait in hospital until a surgery slot became available, then ISTC entry could have
ameliorated the need for such premature admissions. We think it is unlikely that our esti-
mated reductions in pre-surgery LOS at ISTC-exposed hospitals could be explained by this
channel, for two reasons. First, blocking a bed until a surgery slot becomes availablewould
be a very costlyway of avoidingwaiting time target breaches. Secondly, there is a substan-
tial literature on NHSwaiting time targets, which describes a wide range of gaming activ-
ities undertaken by hospitals in order to meet waiting time targets, but never (to the best
of our knowledge) refers to hospitals admitting patients prematurely, and making them
wait for a surgery slot to become available, in order to ensure that they did not breach
the maximum permitted waiting time (National Audit Ofﬁce, 2001; Audit Commission,
2003; Bevan and Hood, 2006a; Besley et al., 2009; Propper et al., 2010; EWHC 2787
(QB), 2005).5.7. Ruling out the possible confounding effect of changes in patient volumes
Increases in local capacity could potentially affect incumbents'
efﬁciency by reducing congestion and overcrowding, independent of
any competitive pressure exerted by entrants. Moreover, public
hospitals located near new private entrants may have experienced a
reduction in demand. Any resulting reduction in case loads at nearby
public hospitals could affect average pre-surgery LOS at these incum-
bents, given the important inﬂuence of volume on efﬁciency.
We therefore investigated the impact of ISTC exposure on case load
using similar regressions to those used for our main estimates, but
found no statistically signiﬁcant evidence of case load reductions in
our High Treatment group, which had the biggest reductions in pre-
surgery LOS (results available in Table H.1 in the online Supplementary
Material). This suggests that the increases in local capacity brought
about by private surgical centre entry did not lead to any reduction in
the volume of patients treated at High Treatment group hospitals, but,
instead, served to take people off waiting lists and reduce waiting
times. That is, ISTC exposure led to shorter pre-surgery LOS in close-
neighbouring hospitals without any concomitant reduction in the
volume of patients being treated.
We did ﬁnd, however, signiﬁcant reductions in the volume of
patients being treated at Low Treatment group hospitals. This ﬁnding
seems to suggest that ISTC entry did not simply add to overall clinical
capacity, but, at least to some extent, may have reduced patient volume
at public hospitals with which they shared a market – although,
crucially, these patients seem not to have been drawn from the closest
hospitals (i.e. those in the High Treatment group) in which we observe
statistically signiﬁcant reductions in pre-surgery LOS. These ﬁndings
are broadly supportive of our conjecture that the reductions in pre-surgery LOS reported in Table 5 arose primarily through competitive
incentives.206. Discussion and conclusions
This paper examines the effect of a UK government programme
designed to increase capacity and competition by facilitating the
entry of private, for-proﬁt specialty surgical centres into the English
NHS. We test the impact that the entry of these facilities – ISTCs –
had on incumbent public hospitals' efﬁciency, case mix, and case
load. We exploit the fact that ISTC location decisions were driven by
local waiting times, not by other hospital characteristics such as LOS
or clinical performance, to construct treatment and control groups
that are comparable with respect to the outcome variables examined.
Indeed, we demonstrate that trends of key outcome variables – in-
cluding pre-surgery LOS, post-surgery LOS, and patient case mix –
were the same for public hospitals that had an ISTC enter nearby as
for those that did not.
We ﬁnd that public hospitals that had a private, for-proﬁt surgical
centre enter close by experienced substantial reductions in pre-
surgery length of stay for hip and knee replacement surgery. The
addition of an ISTC to a public hospital's immediate neighbourhood
led to a decrease in pre-surgery LOS of around 16% – or a 24 percentage
point increase in the proportion of patients treated on the day of
Fig. 5. Treatment effects with alternative treatment group deﬁnitions (treatment deﬁned
using patient ﬂows). Notes: Figures plot treatment effects (coefﬁcients and 95%
conﬁdence intervals) as the cutoff distance from home to hospital used to deﬁne the
treatment group (measured in percentiles of distance travelled) changes. For example, a
percentile cutoff of 25 implies that the treatment group consists of all public hospitals
that had an ISTC enter within the circular area around the hospital deﬁned by a radius
equal to the 25th percentile of patient distance travelled, deﬁned using patient ﬂows
from 2002/3 to 2004/5. In all cases, the comparator (control) group consists of all public
hospitals that did not have an ISTC enter within the 95th percentile of patient distance
travelled. Patient's home address is proxied by centroid of residential LSOA. Standard
errors are clustered around hospitals.
Fig. 6. Treatment effects with alternative treatment group deﬁnitions (treatment deﬁned
using straight-line distances). Notes: Figures plot treatment effects (coefﬁcients and 95%
conﬁdence intervals) as the cutoff distance from home to hospital used to deﬁne the
treatment group (measured in kilometre distances) changes. For example, a distance of
10 implies that the treatment group consists of all public hospitals that had an ISTC
enter within the circular area around the hospital deﬁned by a 10 km radius. In all cases,
the comparator (control) group consists of all public hospitals that did not have an ISTC
enter within a 30 km radius. Patient's home address is proxied by centroid of residential
LSOA. Standard errors are clustered around hospitals.
77Z. Cooper et al. / Journal of Public Economics 166 (2018) 63–80admission. Given that these faster turnaround times were achieved
without additional expenditure (as they occurred in an environment
with ﬁxed payments per procedure), they suggest that hospitals
exposed to competition from new private entrants became more
efﬁcient.
As well as investigating possible positive effects of ISTC entry on
the efﬁciency of incumbent public hospitals, we looked for evidence
of possible negative effects in the form of worsened case mix. We
ﬁnd that ISTC entry led nearby public hospitals to experience an
11.6% increase in patients' average illness severity as captured by
the Charlson score – or a 6.2 percentage point increase in the propor-
tion of patients with a Charlson score of three or more. We also ﬁnd
suggestive evidence that this increase in the sickness of incumbent
hospitals' patients led to an increase in post-surgery LOS. While our
identiﬁcation strategy is unable to pinpoint how much of this increase
in patient complexity at incumbent NHS hospitals is due to ISTCsactively applying their exclusion criteria – as opposed, for example,
to differential choice behaviour by sick and healthy patients – the
fact remains that surgical centre entry appears to have led to wors-
ened case mix at nearby incumbents, irrespective of the exact channel
by which this effect arose.
In principle, this sorting of patients between private surgical centres
and public hospitals could represent an efﬁciency-improving division
of responsibility between routine and more complex cases. Indeed,
this appears to have been the government's rationale for including
wide-ranging exclusion criteria in ISTC contracts, which would allow
these private entrants to focus on routine cases. Thus, the risk-
selection we document was to some extent an intended policy
outcome. However, the fact that policymakers explicitly intended
such a division of responsibility between private entrants and public
incumbents does not automatically imply that the division was devoid
of negative consequences. To ensure that a division of responsibility
between complex and straightforward cases does not have a negative
effect on the ﬁnancial position of providers that receive the most
Table 10
Additional tests of robustness.
(1) (2) (3)
Log of
pre-surgery LOS
% treated on day of
admission
Log of
Charlson score
A. Test for parallel trends during pre-reform period (2002/3 to 2004/5)
High treatment ×
2004/5 dummy
0.0322 −0.0436 0.00659
(0.0265) (0.0387) (0.0261)
B. Estimation using inverse propensity score weights
High treatment × post −0.167⁎⁎⁎ 0.232⁎⁎⁎ 0.109⁎⁎⁎
(0.0509) (0.0740) (0.0363)
C. Contract start date as t = 0
High treatment × post −0.175⁎⁎ 0.245⁎⁎ 0.123⁎⁎
(0.0741) (0.103) (0.0543)
D. GP-centred treatment assignment
High treatment × post −0.186⁎⁎⁎ 0.259⁎⁎⁎ 0.125⁎⁎
(0.0657) (0.0903) (0.0526)
E. Outcomes in levels, not logs
High treatment × post −0.264⁎⁎⁎ – 0.309⁎⁎
(0.100) (0.147)
Notes: Sample includes hip and knee replacement patients. The table reports robustness
tests of the main estimates for the High Treatment group based on the ‘headline’ regression
speciﬁcation (Eq. (2)),withhospitalﬁxed effects and a full set ofmonth-year dummies.With
the exception of Panels A and C, this table uses 2004/5 as the pre-reform period and 2008/9
as the post-reform period.With the exception of Panel D, treatment groups are deﬁned as in
the Table 5 notes. Standard errors and statistical signiﬁcance are deﬁned as in the Table 5
notes. Panel A is a placebo regression with 2002/3 as the pre-reform year and 2004/5 as
the post-reform year. Panel B weights observations by the inverse of the probability of as-
signment to the treatment or control group that they were actually assigned to. Panel C de-
ﬁnes the post-reformperiod as the period after the contract start date of the nearest ISTC and
deﬁnes time relative to this date instead of using calendar time;months−12 to−1 are des-
ignated as the pre-reform period, while months 24 to 35 are designated as the post-reform
period. Panel D assigns treatments by centring hospital markets on GP surgeries rather than
hospitals themselves. Panel E runs the regression on levels of the outcome variable rather
than logs. All regressions include a dummy variable indicating hip replacement.
78 Z. Cooper et al. / Journal of Public Economics 166 (2018) 63–80complex patients, hospitals that treat sicker patients must be appropri-
ately compensated.21
Unfortunately, NHS reimbursement rates during the period we study
did not adequately adjust for patient severity (Mason et al., 2008). This
situation not only provided private surgical centre entrants with an
added impetus to risk select, but it also meant that nearby incumbent
public hospitals were left treating a costlier mix of patients without ade-
quate ﬁnancial compensation. While the prospective reimbursement re-
gime (Payment by Results) was updated in April 2009 to include a
more dramatic adjustment for patient severity, Mason et al. (2008) state
that providers were still likely underpaid for treating sicker patients,
and note that is unlikely that a prospective reimbursement system can
ever be designed to fully compensate hospitals for amore costly casemix.
Our work highlights one trade-off that arises from the entry of for-
proﬁt surgical centres. We show that entry can stimulate improvements
in the performance of incumbents, but that entrants may engage in risk
selection at the expense of incumbents. These ﬁndings offer insights
into many situations involving provision of public services where
proﬁtability is inﬂuenced by characteristics of the recipient: namely that
the case for increased private sector involvement should depend, in
part, on comparison of the beneﬁts of increased competitive pressure,
with the costs arising from cream skimming by private entrants.
Our work is part of the broader task of evaluating the overall social
welfare implications of the entry of private ﬁrms into the market for21 When certain types of care are removed frompublic facilities and shifted to theprivate
sector, it can also have negative dynamic effects throughmissed learning opportunities for
public sector clinicians and care professionals. Although not part of our formal analysis,
personal conversations with clinicians indicate that an additional negative effect of ISTC
entry was that it reduced the number of straightforward cases at nearby NHS teaching
hospitals, which are essential for the training of surgical registrars.delivery of public services. Such an overall evaluation would not only
consider the impacts of private provider entry on the performance of
public incumbents, but would also compare the performance of private
and public providers, as well as taking into account any increases in
overall capacity resulting from private surgical centre entry.
An interesting thought experiment is to consider whether our
selection results were a function of the for-proﬁt status of entrants, or
of the fact that entrants were specialist surgical centres who competed
against full service hospitals. Ultimately, theory and the broader
evidence suggest that both distinctions – competition from for-proﬁt
ventures and competition from specialist surgical centres – likely
drove our selection results (Barro et al., 2006; Dafny, 2005; Cram
et al., 2005; Street et al., 2010).
Our ﬁndings raise a key question: is it possible to reap the positive
effects of increased competition resulting from expanded independent
sector provisionwithin theNHS, without the negative effects? It is likely
that the answer to this question depends on whether it is possible to
risk-adjust payments and outcome measures sufﬁciently to ensure
that independent sector providers have an incentive to make proﬁts
by raising efﬁciency and clinical quality, not by selecting against certain
patients. Absent suitably risk-adjusted payments, new entrants may
take steps to attract patients that are less costly to treat, leaving incum-
bents with a riskier mix of patients.
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